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Abstract
This investigation was aimed at studying the relations between executive functions (EFs) and categorical emotion understanding while
controlling for preschoolers’ IQ, language ability and theory of mind (ToM). Specifically, we wanted to analyse the association between
emotion understanding and set shifting, due to the lack of studies with this EF. Data of 75 children aged 4½ years (52% boys) was
collected in two laboratory visits. Emotion understanding was assessed using the Emotion Recognition Questionnaire, inhibitory control
using the Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders task and set shifting using a version of the Dimensional Change Card Sort task. IQ was evaluated
using the WPPSI-R, language using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised; and ToM using six standardized tasks. Set shifting, but
not inhibitory control, predicted emotion understanding, over and above mothers’ age, and children’s IQ, language ability, and ToM.
Mothers’ age and children’s language ability were also significant predictors in the final regression model. Results suggest that the
capacity to shift mental sets is linked with inter-individual differences in children’s understanding of situational causes of emotion. There-
fore studying EFs as correlates of emotion understanding is an important focus of future research.
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Understanding emotion is a key element for the successful social
adjustment of children. Children that are more successful at under-
standing emotional cues are more likely to develop appropriate
social skills and prosocial responses to peers and to form positive
interpersonal relationships that foster adaptation to social situations
(de Rosnay, Harris, & Pons, 2008; Harris, 2006). For example, pre-
schoolers’ ability to recognize and understand others’ emotions has
been linked to their social competence (Trentacosta & Fine, 2010);
peer acceptance, popularity and leadership (Harris, 2008); dimin-
ished aggressive behaviors (Denham et al., 2002); fewer externaliz-
ing and internalizing problems (Trentacosta & Fine, 2010); school
readiness and early academic competences (Denham et al., 2012;
Garner & Waajid, 2008; Leerkes, Paradise, O’Brien, Calkins, &
Lange, 2008). Even though children’s understanding of emotion
improves with age, early individual differences in the overall level
of such understanding persist across development (Pons & Harris,
2005). Accordingly, studying correlates of early emotion under-
standing is an important focus of investigation. In this study, we
focused on children’s individual characteristics that may be associ-
ated with the development of categorical emotion understanding
based on the situational causes of emotions.
Children’s emotion understanding comprises the way they iden-
tify, predict, and explain emotions with respect to themselves and
others (Harris, 2008). Initially, children’s understanding of emo-
tions is broad valence-based (Sze´kely et al., 2011; Widen, 2013)
and only later emerges in the basic categorical form (e.g., happi-
ness, anger, sadness). Children aged 2 to 3 years use the dimensions
of valence (pleasure/feels good—displeasure/feels bad) and arou-
sal/intensity (high arousal – sleepiness) to classify emotions (Widen
& Russell, 2008). For instance, research on facial emotion recogni-
tion has shown that 3-year-olds are more likely to mistake an emo-
tion facial expression for another with the same valence and similar
levels of arousal (e.g., labelling anger instead of sadness) rather
than for an emotion facial expression with different valence (e.g.,
labelling sadness instead of happiness) (Sze´kely et al., 2011;
Widen, 2013). Therefore, at approximately 3½ years of age, chil-
dren label all positive expressions as happy and use the same label
for all negative expressions, for example, angry or sad. By this age,
the label (e.g., sad) is used as a broad negative emotion category
(e.g., feels bad) that is still far from the meaning conveyed by an
adult (Widen, 2013). On average, 4-year-olds are able to distinguish
anger from sadness and from happiness (Widen, 2013). Next, they
develop the capacity to distinguish happy, from sad, from angry,
and from fearful (or surprised). When children approach 6 years
of age, they distinguish among happiness, anger, sadness, fear, and
surprise. Research supports this broad-to-differentiated pattern of
emotion understanding development in label use as well as when
children must identify a character’s emotion based on a story depict-
ing causes and consequences associated with that emotion (Widen,
2013).
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The categorical understanding of emotions implies that children
develop different scripts for each discrete emotion (Widen & Rus-
sell, 2008). Thus, children must develop script-based knowledge
that includes the memorization and identification of that emotion,
the characteristics of the situations that normally elicit that emotion
(e.g., situational causes such as anticipating that a boy will be sad if
he loses a favorite toy), and the usual actions (i.e., behavioral con-
sequences) and expressions (e.g., facial expression, vocalization)
that follow (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Harris, 2008; Widen & Russell,
2008). Nevertheless, scripts do not emerge fully formed, but rather,
different script components are added over time throughout the
child’s development (Widen, 2013). Interestingly, it seems that
younger children use facial expressions as cues for early valence-
based emotion understanding. However, as children progress
towards categorical understanding, they first master the match
between categorical labels of emotion and the situational causes
and behavioral consequences, but not the match between categori-
cal labels and typical facial expressions, with the exception of sur-
prise (Widen & Russell, 2010). Furthermore, it seems that
preschoolers first develop the understanding of causes of emotion
and later the consequences, with the exceptions of anger and sur-
prise (Widen & Russell, 2011). Accordingly, when studying corre-
lates of emerging categorical knowledge of emotions in
preschoolers, as is the case of the present study, it is important to
focus on the understanding of situational causes of emotions.
Even though several child characteristics have been associated
with differences in emotion understanding, language may be funda-
mental for the development of this ability (Ornaghi & Grazzani,
2013; Pons, Lawson, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2003), as social interac-
tions are heavily dependent on verbal exchanges (Pons et al., 2003).
Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from research relating
engagement in family discussions about emotions and children’s
emotion understanding (Harris, 2008). Furthermore, specific
emotional-state language use may impact emotion understanding,
as attested by training studies targeting this language component
(Ornaghi, Brockmeier, & Gavazzi, 2011). Hence, emotional
mental-state literacy allows children to represent, describe, and
understand their own and others’ emotional internal lives (Ornaghi
& Grazzani, 2013).
Another characteristic associated with emotion understanding
is IQ (Bennett, Bendersky, & Lewis, 2005; Pears & Fisher, 2005;
Sullivan, Bennett, Carpenter, & Lewis, 2008; cf. Montirosso,
Peverelli, Frigerio, Crespi, & Borgatti, 2010). Nonverbal intelli-
gence was recently found to predict several key aspects of emotion
understanding (Albanese, De Stasio, Di Chiacchio, Fiorilli, & Pons,
2010). Thus, processes that are central to analytical intelligence,
such as the ability to address novelty, and the ability to reason and
to solve problems involving new information may help children
identify the right emotional cues that represent and communicate
the emotion present in an emotional task (Albanese et al., 2010).
Another much-studied individual characteristic is theory of
mind (ToM; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, &
Morrell, 2004; J. Dunn, 2000; O’Brien et al., 2011), though its rela-
tion with emotion understanding is controversial. Whereas some
argue that these are two distinct domains of children’s developing
social cognition and that any associations may be due to the influ-
ence of shared socio-demographic variables (Cutting & Dunn,
1999), others claim that these are related but different phenomena.
According to the latter, the capacity to understand others’ emo-
tional states emerges first, which then helps children to develop
an understanding of others’ cognitive states and thinking (e.g.,
beliefs) (Bartsch & Estes, 1996; J. Dunn, 2000). By the contrary,
de Rosnay et al. (2004) showed that children first develop the
capacity to understand false belief and only later master the ability
to accurately attribute expressions of emotion based on that false
belief. Therefore, it may be that skills related with the understand-
ing of conflicting mental states help children to understand others’
emotions and the underlying causes of those emotions (Harwood &
Farrar, 2006). In contrast, a recent longitudinal investigation with 3-
and 4-year-olds revealed that early emotion understanding pre-
dicted later theory-of-mind performance, not the reverse (O’Brien
et al., 2011). Trying to reconcile both perspectives that advocate
in favor of an interplay between emotion understanding and ToM,
the authors hypothesized that, in early development, emotion
understanding comes first and influences the development of ToM.
However, the reverse may actually occur later on, as these compe-
tences become more complex, such as when children begin to rea-
son about beliefs (O’Brien et al., 2011). This framework implies
that at least some aspects of emotion understanding cannot be
reduced to an emotional ToM and that different pathways of influ-
ence may emerge throughout development. The present investiga-
tion is accordingly anchored on this assumption.
Based on the literature review, one may conclude that as chil-
dren add components to pre-existing scripts, they differentiate pre-
vious scripts into more precise scripts that gradually resemble adult
emotion categories (Widen & Russell, 2011) while co-occurring
and related acquisitions in cognition and socio-cognition are taking
place. Nevertheless, the role of executive functions (EFs) in emo-
tion understanding remains to be thoroughly investigated. A grow-
ing body of literature has highlighted the bidirectional relation
between EFs and social interaction, as well as the cognitive skills
implicated in such relations (Moriguchi, 2014). For instance, long-
itudinal and intervention studies indicate that EFs are necessary for
the emergence of ToM (Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson, & Zelazo, 2013;
Carlson, Koenig, & Harms, 2013). In addition, we argue that EFs
may be relevant for emotion understanding for two other reasons.
The first is that research has shown intricate relations between lan-
guage and EFs (Fatzer & Roebers, 2012; Kuhn et al., 2014; S. E.
Miller & Marcovitch, 2011), and EFs are, to varying degrees,
related to intelligence (Friedman et al., 2006). Second, given that
EFs are related with concept formation and identification (Fine
et al., 2009), emotions, in their categorical form, imply the develop-
ment of emotion scripts/concepts. Thus, it is plausible that EFs will
also be associated with the development of emotion concepts/
scripts.
EFs are a collection of top-down processes that allow for con-
scious, goal-directed control of thoughts and actions (Diamond,
2013; Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). The three core processes of EFs are
inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility (i.e.,
set shifting) (Diamond, 2013). However, there are questions about
the tri-component nature of EFs in preschool-aged children. Inves-
tigations using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) have demon-
strated that a single or a two-factor model—working memory and
inhibitory control—of EFs fits the data (Wiebe, 2014). However,
a definite answer regarding this question is still absent considering
that most research used working memory and inhibitory control
measures but not set shifting (Wiebe, 2014) and the structure of EFs
emerging from CFA is influenced by the task and performance indi-
cator selected (M. R. Miller, Giesbrecht, Mu¨ller, McInerney, &
Kerns, 2012). Hence, our investigation was based on the assump-
tion that, in preschool aged children, EFs can be divided into sep-
arate, but related, components.
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As in emotion understanding, EFs develop more rapidly for chil-
dren during their preschool years (i.e., 3–4 years old) (Widen, 2013;
Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). For example, although 3-year-olds are
unable to inhibit a pre-potent behavioral response to the Head-
Toes-Knees-Shoulders task, 4–5-year-olds demonstrate the ability
to do so (Ponitz et al., 2008; Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, &
Morrison, 2009). Similarly, 3-year-olds cannot shift rule use in the
Dimensional Change Card Sort task, whereas 4½- to 5-year-olds
can (Diamond, 2013).
Whereas some studies report on the relation between EFs and
emotion understanding (Blankson, O’Brien, Leerkes, Marcovitch,
& Calkins, 2012; Carlson & Wang, 2007; Hughes & Ensor, 2009;
Leerkes et al., 2008), only Denham and colleagues (2012) designed
a study to specifically examine this connection. They investigated
the self-regulatory roots (‘‘cool’’ EFs—inhibitory control of atten-
tion/behavior—and ‘‘hot’’ EFs—inhibitory control of emotionally
charged behavior) of emotion knowledge (labelling and situational
knowledge) in 3- and 4-year-olds and set out to test two opposite
directions of influence. On the one hand, EFs might be foundational
processes of emotional knowledge, as attentional control may be
necessary for children to correctly distinguish among emotions dur-
ing an emotion recognition task. It might also be the case that EFs
help children to better control their behavior, and thus foster posi-
tive social interactions that, in turn, are essential for emotion under-
standing development. On the other hand, it is assumed that
knowledge of one’s own and others’ emotions may facilitate the
development of cognitive processes related with the regulation of
behaviors (i.e., EFs). The results indicated that the early spring
assessment of EFs predicted school-year-end emotion knowledge
(only ‘‘cool’’ EF predicted labelling), but the reverse did not occur,
thus leading to the conclusion that there is more evidence support-
ing that EFs impact emotion knowledge development than the
reverse (Denham et al., 2012). Albeit not focused primarily on the
relations between emotion understanding and EFs, two additional
studies are noteworthy. Leerkes et al. (2008) and Blankson et al.
(2012) tested the hypothesis that preschoolers’ performance on
emotion tasks was organized into discrete processes of emotion
control (temperament, emotion regulation) and emotion under-
standing (affective perspective taking, labelling and knowledge of
emotion causes), whilst the performance on cognitive tasks was
organized into cognitive understanding (ToM) and cognitive con-
trol (inhibitory control, working memory). Contrary to their expec-
tations, the strongest correlation among the four factors was found
between emotion understanding and EFs, that is, across emotional
and cognitive domains. Blankson et al. (2012) provided three
interpretations for their findings, which are consistent with those
of Denham et al. (2012). First, they hypothesized that throughout
development and during emotion-learning events, children who
are better able to hold information in their short-term awareness
and able to inhibit dominant in favor of subdominant information
will be better at regulating their attention in emotion-learning
events. These EFs may assist them in increasing their awareness
of others’ emotions and in strengthening their ability to identify
their own and others’ emotions. Alternatively, based on the
demands of the measures used for assessing emotion understand-
ing, it could be that children must provide an answer based on
emotional stories, which, in itself, is cognitively challenging.
Thus, children must remember the story and inhibit their own feel-
ings about a situation to accurately identify characters’ emotions.
The third interpretive hypothesis featured an opposite direction of
influences such that emotion understanding would influence the
development of EFs. In other words, easy access to the under-
standing of one’s own and others’ emotions would help children
to more promptly focus attention on the cognitive challenges of
the specific tasks at hand rather than to dwell on the emotions
accompanying the task.
In summary, the evidence available in typically developing
children is suggestive of a relation between EFs and emotion
understanding, and the longitudinal investigation of Denham
et al. (2012) supports a possible involvement of EFs in the devel-
opment of emotion understanding. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no available research that has controlled for
the effect of other cognitive and socio-cognitive variables and
their relation with emotion understanding whilst studying the role
of EFs. Therefore, the focus of the present investigation was to
study the relation between EFs and emotion understanding whilst
controlling for the effect of child’s IQ, language, and ToM. IQ and
language were controlled not only because these variables have
long been known to be related with emotion understanding (Alba-
nese et al., 2010; Ornaghi & Grazzani, 2013; Pons et al., 2003;
Sullivan et al., 2008) but also because of their relation with EFs.
IQ tests assess a diverse range of cognitive competences, some
of which are related to problem solving competencies (Wechsler,
2003). Therefore, although intelligence and EFs do not overlap,
associations are found (Friedman et al., 2006). More importantly,
language is a foundational element of preschoolers’ EF capacities
(Kuhn et al., 2014). Some contend that children’s language will
foster their EF abilities as it permits the formation of a mental rep-
resentation of the problem, the development of consciousness
regarding the rules that govern the resolution of that problem and,
in turn, their ability to control their behavior through self-directed
speech (Mu¨ller, Jacques, Brocki, & Zelazo, 2009). Another
account that may provide a lower-level explanation for the previ-
ous theory posits the primordial importance of language as repre-
sentation, such that the use of active, abstract representations
rather than latent, stimulus-specific representations is necessary
for children to develop the capacity to use and develop complex
rule reasoning and higher order rule use associated, for example,
with task switching (Fatzer & Roebers, 2012; Kharitonova, Chien,
Colunga, & Munakata, 2009). Hence, including language was
paramount as we needed to partial out its predictive role on emo-
tion understanding while assessing the role of EFs. Finally, ToM
was included as a control variable due to its close relation with
some of the cognitive correlates featured in our analyses (for lan-
guage and EFs see Carlson et al., 2013). In doing so, we offer fur-
ther clarification into the yet unclear connection between emotion
understanding and ToM (de Rosnay et al., 2004; J. Dunn, 2000;
O’Brien et al., 2011).
To date, the relation between emotion understanding and EFs
remains unclear, even though the study by Denham et al. (2012)
provided valuable input on inhibitory control. In fact, additional
EFs should be examined and the role of set shifting is of special
interest. As emotion understanding develops from valence-based
to discrete categorical understanding (Widen, 2013), it may be
that this process is supported by developing capacities to shift
mental sets, namely, to use complex rules (i.e., embedded rules
(Zelazo, Muller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 2003). First, children use
mainly one dimension of the script—valence—to categorize
emotions. For example, they differentiate anger from happiness
based on the negative valence of the first and the positive
valence of the second. However, they encounter difficulties
when discriminating between anger and sadness because the use
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of only one script component—valence—does not allow for
such distinction. Therefore, only later will they be able to use
several components of the script, or several rules, to categorize
an emotional situation based on valence and on aspects such as
behavior consequences or antecedents, a factor that will permit
differentiating anger from sadness. Nevertheless, to attend to the
different components of the script coordinately and thereby
increase categorical adult-like views of emotions, children must
be able to shift between the rules, that is, between script com-
ponents. Such shifting entails using embedded rules (Frye,
Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo et al., 2003), and the use of such
rules implies establishing a hierarchy in which judgments are
arranged hierarchically beneath setting conditions, that is, subor-
dinate to rules that govern the conditions in which lower order
rules are chosen (Frye et al., 1995; Zelazo et al., 2003). A hier-
archy of this sort is necessary when classifications are in con-
flict across setting conditions. Specifically, with respect to
emotion understanding, the classifications are in conflict across
each script component. Considering the example of anger and
sadness, both belong to the same category if one is using the
rule/script component valence (‘‘feeling bad’’). However, when
sorting by another rule/script component such as behavioral
consequences, these two emotions belong to different categories.
The conflict across setting conditions is instated. Therefore,
although situations that cause sadness and anger both make the
child feel bad, a usual behavioral consequence for sadness is
crying, whereas the consequence for anger is hitting and yelling,
thus allocating the stories to different categories (sadness vs.
anger). For the aforementioned reasons, we propose that higher
capacities to shift mental sets will be linked to better emotion
understanding.
In conclusion, the main aim of this investigation was to study if
EFs, in general, and set shifting, in particular, are correlates of emo-
tion understanding in 4½-year-olds, whilst controlling for relevant
cognitive and socio-cognitive variables. We hypothesized that set
shifting would predict preschoolers’ performance in an emotion
understanding task, above and beyond their language abilities,
IQ, ToM and inhibitory control.
Method
Participants
We recruited 75 Portuguese 4½ year-olds (M ¼ 55.05 months,
SD ¼ 1.53) from child-care centers in Oporto to participate in a
broad longitudinal study on the developmental predictors of school
readiness (see Table 1 for demographics). Mothers were aged 26 to
46 years (M ¼ 36.84, SD ¼ 3.60), and the majority had higher edu-
cation qualifications, were married, had two children and were the
primary caregivers.
Procedure
Children visited the laboratory twice at 4½ years of age. For the
purpose of the present cross-sectional investigation, data collected
in the first session (set shifting, inhibitory control and IQ) and in the
second session (ToM and emotion understanding) were used. The
average elapsed time between sessions was three weeks, which
we tried to maintain constant for all children. In each session, par-
ents were explained the purposes and procedures of the study were
asked for written informed consent for their child’s participation
and were asked to complete a socio-demographic questionnaire.
Measures
Emotion understanding. Emotion understanding was assessed
using the Emotion Recognition Questionnaire (Bierman et al.,
2008; Ribordy, Camras, Stefani, & Spaccarelli, 1988). Children
were read 16 stories that described characters in emotionally evoca-
tive situations. For each story, children were required to associate
typical and unequivocal situational causes of emotion to the basic
emotion depicted by the characters by pointing to pictures of
happy, mad, sad, or scared faces. For each story, a score of 2 was
given if children correctly identified the adequate emotion; a score
of 1 was attributed if children correctly identified the emotion
valence (e.g., mistaking fear for anger); a score of 0 applied if
children did not identify the correct emotion or valence. For exam-
ple, for the story, ‘‘Johnny/Susie wanted his/her friends to come
over to play. So he/she asked them, and they came to play with
him/her at his/her house’’, children had to choose the happy face
to score a 2 for this item. A total score (a ¼ .69 for our sample)
was calculated (range 0–32).
IQ. IQ was assessed using a short version of theWechsler Preschool
and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (WPPSI-R; Wechsler,
2003) that consisted of the Information and Block Design subtests.
The Information subtest required children to answer questions
addressing general knowledge, and the Block Design subtest
assessed children’s ability to copy models using two-colored
blocks. Based on children’s scaled scores on these two tasks, their
full IQ was estimated following the procedure described by Sattler
(1992) and which has been performed in previous studies (e.g.,
Shields, Palermo, Powers, Grewe, & Smith, 2003).
Language ability. Language ability was assessed using the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised (PPVT-R; L. M. Dunn & Dunn,
1981). After hearing a word, children were asked to choose the cor-
responding picture from a set of four pictures. The coding consisted
of subtracting the total number of errors from the highest item the
child attained. As Portuguese norms for this instrument are not yet
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of participants (N ¼ 75) .
N %
Child
Sex
Female 36 48
Male 39 52
Mother
Years of education
9th grade 1 1.3
12th grade 11 14.7
Bachelor degree 51 68
Masters/Doctoral degree 12 16
Marital status
Married 62 82.7
Unmarried 7 9.3
Divorced 6 8.0
Number of children
1 26 34.7
2 40 53.3
3 7 9.3
4 2 2.7
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available, an age-adjusted residual for the raw scores was computed
and used in the statistical analyses.
Theory of mind. Theory of mind was assessed using a set of six
standardized tasks, four of which were derived from a theory of
mind scale for preschoolers (Wellman & Liu, 2004). These four
included i) Diverse Beliefs, ii) Knowledge Access, iii) Unexpected
Contents False Belief, and iv) Explicit False Belief. The two addi-
tional false belief tasks (Hughes et al., 2000) were v) Unexpected
Contents II, and vi) Unexpected Location. The order of presentation
of the first two tasks was fixed, whilst the order of the remaining
tasks was counterbalanced. All the tasks were coded in terms of
success (1) or failure (0), and to succeed on each of the tasks, the
children had to correctly answer both the control and the key ques-
tions. Inter-rater reliability was very good (mean Cohen’s kappa ¼
.98, range ¼ .88–1.00). A composite theory of mind score consist-
ing of the sum of the childrens’ scores on all six tasks was calcu-
lated (range 0–6), and the internal consistency of the final score
was very good (Kuder-Richardson ¼ .98).
Inhibitory control. Inhibitory control was assessed using the Head-
Toes-Knees-Shoulders task (HTKS; Ponitz et al., 2009). This pro-
cedure involved two rules, and children were asked to perform the
opposite of the researcher’s oral prompts. For example, when the
researcher said, ‘‘touch your head’’, the children were required to
touch their toes; when the researcher said, ‘‘touch your toes’’, the
children should have touched their head. This procedure was
divided into two parts. Part I consisted of four practice trials with
feedback followed by 10 test trials. For children who responded
correctly to five or more test trials, Part II was administered
wherein two new prompts were added—‘‘touch your shoulders’’
and ‘‘touch your knees’’—to the previous prompts, thus resulting
in a total of four rules. Again, the child was instructed to do the
opposite of that requested by the researcher. Four practice trials
with feedback were administered followed by 10 test trials. Each
trial was scored as 0 for an incorrect response, 1 for an incorrect
response followed by a spontaneous correction towards the correct
response, and 2 for a correct response. Final scores for the task were
the sum of the children’s performance on Part I (10 items) and on
Part II (10 items) (range 0–40). The internal consistency of the final
score was very good (Kuder-Richardson ¼ .93).
Set shifting. Set shifting was assessed using a modified version of the
Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS; Frye et al., 1995;
Zelazo, 2006), which was developed by a research group at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota led by Stephanie Carlson. The researcher
showed children two boxes with target cards affixed to the front and
gave them a series of cards to sort. There were several sorting games
organized in the following ascending order of difficulty.
i) Categorization/Reverse categorization: In the categorization
test children had to sort ‘‘big kitty’’ and ‘‘little kitty’’ cards into
the corresponding boxes—one with a ‘‘big kitty’’ attached and
another with a ‘‘little kitty’’ attached. In the reverse categoriza-
tion test the same cards as in categorization are used, but now
children had to put the ‘‘little kitty’’ cards in the ‘‘big kitty’’ box
and vice-versa.
ii) Separated color/shape: in the separated color game, the trial
cards were ‘‘red with a black star’’ or ‘‘blue with a black truck’’.
Children were instructed that all the red things would go to the
box that had the ‘‘red card with a black truck picture’’. The
researcher would continue explaining that all the blue things
would go to the box that had the ‘‘blue card with a black star
picture’’. In the separated shape test, children used the same
cards as before, but now had to sort them by shape.
iii) Integrated color/shape: in the integrated color game children
had to sort cards by color—red or blue. The trial cards were
‘‘white with a blue truck’’ and ‘‘white with a red star’’. Both
target cards affixed to boxes were white, but one had a ‘‘red
truck picture’’ and the other had a ‘‘blue star picture’’. In the
integrated shape test the same cards were used, but the child
was asked to sort by shape.
iv) Mixed: the cards used were the same as those used in the inte-
grated game. The children were instructed that sometimes
they were going to play the shape game and sometimes the
color game, depending on whether the researcher said, ‘‘Play
the shape game’’ versus ‘‘Play the color game’’ when giving
out the card.
v) Advanced border/reverse border: in the advanced border test,
the cards attached to the boxes were the same as those used in
the integrated games, but the test cards were as follows: white
cards with blue truck picture and black border; white cards
with blue truck picture; white cards with red star picture and
white cards with red star and black border. Children were
instructed to play the color game if there was a border and
to play the shape game if there was no border. In the advanced
reverse border, children were instructed to reverse the rule,
that is, play the shape game if the card had a black border and
play the color game if the card had no border.
Our sample consisted of 4½-year-olds, therefore the DCCS admin-
istration started with the integrated color test. If children completed
five out of six trials correctly, the researcher administered the inte-
grated shape test. The tests continued as long as children completed
five out of six trials correctly in each dimension for color and shape.
If children failed the integrated color test (less than five correct
answers), the researcher administered the less difficult DCCS sort-
ing tests in a predetermined order. Children’s final scores were the
sum of the total number of correct trials plus the total number of
correct answers on the tests with lower levels of difficulty that were
not administered. The internal consistency was determined to be
very good (Kuder-Richardson ¼ .97).
Analytic plan
Descriptive measures were first presented, followed by associations
between children’s sex and age, as well between mother’s age and
education level and the variables of interest—emotion understand-
ing, language, IQ, ToM, inhibitory control, and set shifting. Finally,
a hierarchical regression analysis with emotion understanding as the
outcome variable was conducted. In the first step, mother’s age was
included as it was the only demographic variable found to be related
with emotion understanding. In the second step, the cognitive vari-
ables, IQ and language ability, were entered as predictors, as research
has highlighted the associations of these two variables not only with
emotion understanding but also with ToM and EFs. In the third step,
the socio-cognitive variable (ToM) was included. Finally, inhibitory
control and set shifting were added in the fourth and fifth steps,
respectively. They were entered separately because previous studies
that are suggestive of a relation between EFs and emotion under-
standing used inhibitory control measures (Denham et al., 2012), thus
leaving the association with set shifting open for exploration.
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Results
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations between
demographics and study variables
Descriptive statistics for sample variables and their intercorrela-
tions are presented in Table 2. Positive correlations were found
between children’s age and set shifting; mother’s age and child’s
emotion understanding and inhibitory control; and mother’s educa-
tion level and child’s inhibitory control. A marginally significant
association was found between the mother’s education and the
child’s IQ.
Children’s emotion understanding was positively correlated
with IQ, language ability, inhibitory control, and set shifting. Emo-
tion understanding and ToM were marginally associated.
Predicting emotion understanding
As shown in Table 3, in step 1, mother’s age emerged as a signif-
icant predictor of emotion understanding. In step 2, IQ and lan-
guage ability were introduced, but only the latter was found to be
a significant predictor. In step 3, ToM did not predict emotion
understanding,1 nor did inhibitory control in step 4. In step 5, set
shifting emerged as a significant predictor, over and above the effect
of the variables in the previous steps. The inclusion of this last variable
resulted in a significant increase in R2 from .36 to .40. Thus, of all the
variables in the regression equation, three significantly predicted emo-
tion understanding: mother’s age, child’s language ability, and set
shifting. Children of older mothers and with better language ability
and better capacities to shift mental sets are expected to have better
emotion understanding.
Discussion
This empirical study aimed at exploring the relations between 4½-
year-olds’ executive functions—inhibitory control and set shift-
ing—and their emotion understanding after controlling for IQ, lan-
guage, and ToM. We believe that our cross-sectional research
advances extant literature as we analysed the association between
EFs and emotion understanding whilst controlling for important
cognitive and socio-cognitive variables. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first study to examine the specific relation between
set shifting and emotion understanding, a relationship that was sup-
ported by our results. Unexpectedly, however, inhibitory control
did not emerge as a relevant predictor in the tested model. Further
significant predictors of emotion understanding include mother’s
age and child’s language ability.
The fact that set shifting emerged as a significant predictor of
children’s emotion understanding is interesting and innovative. The
results indicated that, although language seems to be necessary for
the development of preschoolers’ EFs (Kuhn et al., 2014) and for
emotion understanding (Gavazzi & Ornaghi, 2011), part of the var-
iance regarding emotion understanding was exclusively attributed
to set shifting. Similarly, bearing in mind that i) EFs and IQ, although
distinct constructs (Friedman et al., 2006), entail problem solving; ii)
inhibitory control relates considerably with set shifting (Diamond,
2013); and iii) ToM is, according to some, related to the development
of emotion understanding (de Rosnay et al., 2004), our results
showed that the possible overlap between these variables and set
shifting does not fully account for the link between set shifting and
emotion understanding.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations (N ¼ 75).
Min Max Range M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Child’s age (months) 53 60 7 55.05 1.53 –
2. Mother’s age (years) 26 46 20 36.84 3.60 .14 –
3. Mother’s years of education1 2 5 3 .07 .06 –
4. Emotion understanding 15 32 17 25.89 4.07 .09 .36** .07 –
5. IQ 79 139 60 118.40 12.39 .13 .06 .20y .32** –
6. Language ability2 46 126 80 91.47 19.61 0 .14 –.12 .47*** .44*** –
7. Theory of mind 16.67 100 83.33 57.73 25.66 .01 .19 .08 .23y .10 .16 –
8. Inhibitory control 0 38 38 23.81 11.74 .19 .24* .26* .35** .41*** .29* .12 –
9. Set shifting 10 71 61 45.15 12.59 .26* .10 .17 .42*** .29** .35** .21y .28* –
Note. 1All correlations with mother’s years of education are Spearman correlations. 2Descriptives presented using PPVT-R’s raw scores and correlations using the age-
adjusted residual.
yp < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis summary for mother’s age, IQ,
language, theory of mind, inhibitory control and set shifting predicting emo-
tion understanding (N ¼ 75).
R2 (Adjusted R2) F change B
Step 1: .13 (.12) 10.91**
Mother’s age .36**
Step 2: .33 (.30) 10.58***
Mother’s age .30**
IQ .14
Language ability .37**
Step 3: .34 (.30) .98
Mother’s age .28**
IQ .14
Language ability .36**
Theory of Mind .10
Step 4: .36 (.31) 1.71
Mother’s age .26*
IQ .09
Language ability .34**
Theory of Mind .10
Inhibitory control .14
Step 5: .40 (.35) 4.96*
Mother’s age .26*
IQ .06
Language ability .29*
Theory of Mind .06
Inhibitory control .11
Set shifting .23*
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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To progress from a valence-based emotion understanding to a
discrete categorical understanding, as is developmentally expected
(Widen, 2013), children may need to develop set shifting capacities
that allow for complex categorization using embedded rules. This
cognitive growth may support their capacity to develop and use
emotion scripts, which are also complex categories formed by the
combination of different components (e.g., facial displays, situa-
tional causes, and behavioral consequences). This view, supported
by longitudinal and intervention studies (Benson et al., 2013; Carl-
son et al., 2013; Moriguchi, 2014) and commonly referred to as the
‘‘emergence account’’ (Benson et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 2013),
postulates that EFs are necessary for the emergence of certain
socio-cognitive competences. Within this perspective, it is also pos-
sible that children who are better able to executively control their
behaviors, may develop better relations with others, which, in turn,
are fundamental for the development of emotion understanding
(Harris, 2008). Alternatively, the ‘‘expression account’’ (Benson
et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 2013) suggests that the association
between the two variables may be due to methodological issues.
The task used to assess emotion understanding requires children
to infer emotions based on stories that they must decode and then
to adjust their answer from story to story. As these cognitive
demands may be associated with their executive function level, this
may explain the relation that was found between children’s perfor-
mance on the emotion understanding task and set shifting. How-
ever, as DCCS is not a pure measure of set shifting (Anderson &
Reidy, 2012) and as set shifting shares common features with inhi-
bitory control and working memory (Diamond, 2013), one cannot
discard the roles of other EF components.
In contrast, emotion understanding may foster the development of
set shifting. Children who are better equipped to decode their own
and others’ emotions may be more predisposed to control their beha-
viors to adjust it to that of their social partners. This functioning may
result in more opportunities to practice EFs, which might contribute
to increased levels of performance with respect to these abilities.
Surprisingly, inhibitory control did not emerge as a predictor of
emotion understanding, which conflicts with previous studies
(Blankson et al., 2012; Denham et al., 2012). Indeed, the significant
bivariate correlation between inhibitory control and emotion under-
standing did not stand when other variables were included in the
model. However, bearing in mind the overlap between set shifting
and inhibitory control, these results do not prove that inhibitory con-
trol is not associated with emotion understanding. There is an open
debate if during preschool years it is possible to reliably identify the
three core processes of EFs: inhibitory control, working memory, and
set shifting (Wiebe, 2014). In fact, if these are still in a process of dif-
ferentiation, our measures may not have allowed for disentangling
inhibitory control and set shifting, precluding any definite conclu-
sions regarding the role of each one. From a psychometric stand-
point, we may also speculate about the specific components of
inhibitory control assessed. Bothmeasures (HTKS and DCCS) assess
cognitive inhibition, given that the child has to inhibit a rule previ-
ously learned. However, HTKS also assesses behavioral inhibition
(i.e., resisting acting impulsively) as the child is required to perform
his/her answer through gross motor movements (e.g., ‘‘touch your
toes’’). It is a plausible assumption that the capacity to inhibit a script
component and then shift component as outlined above may be more
associatedwith cognitive than behavioral inhibition. Therefore, future
researchcouldbenefit fromenriching their designby including thedif-
ferent components of inhibitory control as Diamond (2013) pro-
poses—resisting temptations, resisting acting impulsively, selective
attention and cognitive inhibition—in order to clarify the relations
between inhibition and emotion understanding.
In addition to EFs, children’s language ability, but not their IQ,
emerged as a significant predictor of emotion understanding. Two
interpretative hypotheses may be advanced. On the one hand, some
of the studies that evidenced a relation with IQ used high-risk sam-
ples (Bennett et al., 2005; Pears & Fisher, 2005; Sullivan et al.,
2008), whereas ours uses a low-risk sample. In adverse contexts,
IQ differences may have an exponential impact on children’s capa-
cities to understand emotions when they are stressed by many other
difficulties. An alternate hypothesis is that script components that
are first mastered throughout development may not be related with
IQ, but script components associated with higher representational
demands may be so. For example, Albanese et al. (2010) found that
nonverbal intelligence did not predict external components of emo-
tion understanding that included, as in our study, attributions
regarding external causes of emotion, but it did predict mental
(e.g., beliefs) and reflective (e.g., moral emotions) components.
Furthermore, Montirosso et al. (2010) found that IQ was not asso-
ciated with facial expression recognition in 4–18-year-olds.
Our study supports research accounting for the importance of
language for emotion understanding. Language may be fundamen-
tal for children to engage in social interactions that are crucial for
the development of emotion understanding (Gavazzi & Ornaghi,
2011), to represent emotional states, and/or to perform on emotion
understanding tests (Ornaghi & Grazzani, 2013; Pons et al., 2003).
Language also seems to be a necessary process for the development
of EFs in preschool (Kuhn et al., 2014). Accordingly, it could be
that the relation between language and emotion understanding
found in prior studies was actually explained by a relation between
language and EFs. Our research suggests that this is not the case
because language explains a specific part of the variance of emotion
understanding that is over and above the predictor role of mother’s
age and set shifting. Furthermore, this investigation highlights that
the association of language with emotion understanding cannot be
better explained by general (IQ) or specific (EFs) cognitive func-
tioning. Therefore, language with its pragmatic component (i.e.,
rules for social use) may support children’s capacity to understand
emotional concepts that are also social in nature.
Contrary to our expectations, ToM did not emerge as a predictor
of emotion understanding, which conflicts with the research
that attests to the significant relation between both constructs (de
Rosnay et al., 2004; Harwood & Farrar, 2006; Hughes & Dunn,
1998; O’Brien et al., 2011). This result may be explained by the
task material used to assess emotion understanding—stories with
typical and unequivocal situational causes of emotion where there
is little (to no) conflict between what the children and the character
may feel in the portrayed situation, thus requiring minimal use of
mentalizing capacities. Our result is partially consistent with that
of O’Brien et al. (2011), who did not find an association between
unequivocal emotional reactions and ToM, though they did find
an association between emotion labelling and stories evoking equi-
vocal emotional reactions. In addition, Harwood and Farrar (2006)
found a correlation between ToM and emotion understanding but
highlighted that a higher correlation emerged when children were
asked to predict another person’s emotion when it differed from
their own, rather than when it was congruent with their emotional
state. Faced with our and others’ results, we argue that ToM under-
standing may not overlap or be fundamental for the development of
certain aspects of emotion understanding (cf. de Rosnay et al.,
2004; Harris, 2006), specifically when children have to reason
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about situational causes of emotion based on desires. Neverthe-
less, as O’Brien et al. (2011) hypothesized, the nature of this rela-
tionship may change as children’s reasoning progresses to include
conflicting views and beliefs, such that ToM and emotion under-
standing may become intertwined later in development. This view
encompasses our non-significant findings, alongside other inves-
tigations that report a relation between ToM and emotion
understanding.
Finally, mother’s age seems to relate to children’s emotion under-
standing with children of older mothers demonstrating an advantage.
This result seems to corroborate previous work that showed an asso-
ciation between an increase in mother’s age and improved health and
development (e.g., fewer social and emotional difficulties) for chil-
dren up to 5 years of age (Sutcliffe, Barnes, Belsky, Gardiner, &Mel-
huish, 2012). However, contrary to existing interpretations (Sutcliffe
et al., 2012), in our sample, this link cannot be accounted for by a
relation to mother’s higher education as neither variables was corre-
lated. Still, one can speculate that these mothers may be more
adjusted to their jobs as they have been working longer, making
them more effective in balancing work and family demands. Spe-
cifically, these mothers may be more prone to interact with their
children outside routine caregiving (e.g., meals) and to develop
more positive interactions, while also initiating and maintaining
discussions about emotions, which is known to foster emotion
understanding development (Bennett et al., 2005; Harris, 2008).
A limitation of the present research is its cross-sectional
design, which precludes concluding whether set shifting is neces-
sary for emotion understanding, whether the inverse is true, or
whether they are just co-occurring developmental phenomena.
Furthermore, the emotion understanding assessment measure only
covered one component of the emotion script (i.e., external situa-
tional causes of emotion). We framed our research in this way as
we were interested in capturing individual differences co-
occurring with early emotion understanding, and this is one of the
first script components to be acquired when children begin to
develop categorical understanding of emotions (Widen & Russell,
2010, 2011). However, these conclusions may not generalize to
emotion understanding as a whole.
Given the limitations, future research should adopt a longitudi-
nal design that assesses emotion understanding as a multicompo-
nent phenomenon and that includes the assessing of set shifting,
along with other EFs, through multiple measures. Such a research
design would allow for testing the directionality of influence, that
is, from set shifting to emotion understanding or vice-versa. It
would also prove useful for determining whether set shifting is
indeed the EF more strongly related with emotion understanding
or if this is limited to the script component or the assessment mea-
sures used in this investigation.
This research provided new insights into the correlates of emo-
tion understanding in 4½-year-olds, highlighting the specific role of
set shifting. As emotion understanding is associated with numerous
positive social and school-related outcomes (Harris, 2008), and
inter-individual differences appear to be stable throughout child-
hood (Pons & Harris, 2005), this investigation may offer clues into
new foci of intervention in early developmental stages.
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